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This paper addresses the emergence of cooperation in asymmetric pris-
oners￿dilemmas in which one player chooses after having observed the
other player￿ s choice (Trust Game). We use the ￿nite automata approach
with complexity costs to study the equilibria of the repeated version of
this game. We show that there is a small set of automata that form
the unique Closed Under Rational Behavior (CURB) set for this game.
This set contains two non-strict Nash equilibria, a cooperative and a non-
cooperative one. We show that the cooperative equilibrium is the only
(cyclically) stable set under the so called Best Response Dynamics.
JEL Classi￿cation C70 C72.1 Introduction
Explaining the emergence of cooperation in the repeated Prisoner￿ s Dilemma
(PD) is a major problem in several ￿elds ranging from economics to biology and
political science. There are at least two problems that any successful explanation
must address. First, it must explain how cooperators can gain a foothold in a
population of defectors. Second, it must explain how cooperation can remain
stable. For example, what prevents a conditionally cooperative strategy such as
Tit for Tat (TfT) from being invaded by an unconditionally cooperative strategy
such as All Cooperation (AC)?
Binmore and Samuelson [5] (B&S henceforth) discuss these questions in a
model in which strategies are represented by ￿nite automata (or machines),
in the spirit of Abreu and Rubinstein [1]. The payo⁄ an automaton receives
depends upon its own payo⁄ during the game and its complexity as measured
by the number of states. They prove an extremely strong result: the only
machines that can be evolutionarily stable are those that cooperate throughout
most of the interaction.
This result is based on somewhat restrictive assumptions. The literature sub-
sequent to B&S showed that much less encouraging results would be obtained
if they were relaxed. First, B&S assumed that payo⁄s are evaluated with the
limit-of-the-mean criterion. This amounts to assuming that the time-horizon of
the interaction is so long (in fact, in￿nite) that any loss that occurs in a ￿nite
number of rounds can be ignored. Second, complexity costs are ranked lexico-
graphically after the game payo⁄s. A simpler machine will have an advantage
over a more complex one only if it gets at least the same game payo⁄s. Volij
[14] proves that if one allows for the possibility of a trade-o⁄ between these two
parts of a machine￿ s payo⁄, the opposite result can be obtained: Defect is the
only evolutionary stable strategy.1
In this paper we shall deal with the case in which the stage-game is the
sequential version of the PD, usually referred to as Trust Game (TG). We shall
follow Volij [14] in allowing for the possibility of a trade-o⁄ between complexity
costs and game payo⁄s. Game payo⁄s will be evaluated with the discount crite-
rion, with a ￿nite discount factor ￿ 2 (0;1). Our main ￿nding is in line with Bin-
more and Samuelson. We show that the ine¢ cient equilibrium in which players
fail to cooperate cannot be stable under the so called Best Response Dynamics.
At the same time, there is at least one stable cooperative equilibrium. More-
over, Best Response Dynamics can lead a population from the non-cooperative
equilibrium to the cooperative one, but not vice-versa. In short: Trust is bound
to emerge.
To gain an idea of the problems involved, consider the matrixes in Table
1Samuelson and Swinkels [13] present a neat discussion of this matter. They show that the
di⁄erence between B&S and Volji [14] lies in the order in which two limits are taken. Volij
￿xes a (small) cost of complexity and takes the limit for the size of the invading population
that goes to zero. B&S ￿x a (small) invasion barrier and consider the limit for the cost of





AD P1 T1 T + P1
AC S1 R1 R1
TfT S + P1 R1 R1
Table 1: A Prisoner￿ s Dilemma (left) and three strategies for the repeated ver-
sion (right)
1. The players repeatedly play the PD on the left (T > R > P > S) and
are restricted to using three strategies for the repeated game: All cooperation
(AC), All Defection (AD) and Tit for Tat (TfT). The matrix on the right
represents this strategy choice and the outcomes associated with each strategy
pro￿le. P1;T1 and R1 stand for in￿nite streams of P, T and R respectively.
T +P1 (S +P1) stands for a round with payo⁄ T (S), followed by an in￿nite
stream of P.
Suppose for the moment that complexity costs can be ignored and repeated
game payo⁄s are evaluated with the limit-of-the-mean criterion. This implies
that P1 and S + P1 are indistinguishable and therefore that TfT obtains
against AD the same payo⁄ that AD obtains against itself. At the same time,
TfT obtains against itself a payo⁄ that is strictly larger than the payo⁄ AD
obtains against TfT. It follows that AD can be invaded by TfT, and it therefore
fails to be evolutionary stable. Note that when the game-payo⁄s are evaluated
with the discount criterion, P1 always has a larger value than S + P1 and
hence TfT obtains against AD strictly less than AD itself. In this case, a
population of AD cannot be invaded by a tiny fraction of mutants who play
TfT. So the evolutionary instability of AD is crucially based on game payo⁄s
being evaluated with the limit-of-the-mean-criterion.
Suppose now that payo⁄s are evaluated with the limit-of-the-mean criterion,
but complexity costs enter a machine￿ s payo⁄ function. If they are ranked
lexicographically after the game payo⁄s, AD can still be invaded by a negligible
fraction of mutants who play TfT. The reason is that TfT mutants obtain
larger game payo⁄s than the incumbents, no matter how small the fraction of
mutants is. The larger complexity cost of TfT can be ignored, because it is
ranked lexicographically after the game payo⁄. If the costs of complexity were
allowed to directly enter into a machine￿ s payo⁄ function, then a fraction of
mutants who play TfT would obtain a smaller payo⁄ than AD players, unless
the fraction of mutants crosses a minimum, strictly positive, threshold. This is
the intuitive reason why in B&S AD cannot be evolutionarily stable, while in
Volij [14] it is the only evolutionarily stable strategy.
Suppose now that the game being repeated is the Trust Game in Figure 1.
The ￿rst player (the Sender) chooses whether to Trust (T) the second player
(Receiver), who in turn decides whether to Reward (R) the Sender￿ s trust or
not (NR). With the assumption that vS < 0 < 1 < VR, (NT;NR) is the game￿ s
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
We shall assume that the game is played repeatedly by ￿nite automata, and
2Figure 1: The Trust Game
a stream of payo⁄s is evaluated with a ￿nite discount factor ￿ 2 (0;1). The cost
of complexity will be measured by the number of states of a machine, and it will
enter directly into a machine￿ s payo⁄function. We are thus assuming conditions
that are even more severe for the emergence of cooperation than those assumed
by Volij [14].
We shall now sketch what is the main di¢ culty that this approach must
solve. Piccione and Rubinstein [11] proved that in the repeated version of any
sequential game, the only equilibrium is a constant repetition of one of the
equilibria of the stage game. In the TG this would entail that there are no
other equilibria than the in￿nite repetition of (NT;NR).
To see the di⁄erence between the TG and the PD in this respect, consider
again the matrix in Table 1 (right). No matter how complexity costs enter a
machine￿ s payo⁄ function, TfT cannot be in Nash equilibrium with itself. The
reason is that AC obtains against TfT the same payo⁄ as TfT itself, but it
is simpler. Abreu and Rubinstein￿ s [1] proved that two machines can form a
NE only if, in playing one against the other, all their states are visited at least
once. If one state is never reached, one can always build an alternative machine
which produces the same outcome against the other (and hence gets the same
payo⁄ during the game) but has a smaller number of states. When applied to
the PD, this result implies that, since cooperation is sustained by the threat of
some non cooperative behavior, this threat must be carried over at least once
during the playing of the game. Intuitively, TfT cannot be a Nash equilibrium
with itself because two TfT machines never punish each other.
Both in Abreu and Rubinstein [1] and in B&S￿ s evolutionary model, cooper-
ation is achieved only by machines that put the "punishing phase" ￿rst. Each
machine starts by "punishing" the other machine by playing Defect for a ￿xed
number of rounds and does not revert to cooperation unless the other machine
has played Defect for the same number of rounds. Once the "punishing phase"
is over, both machines start cooperating. Switching to defection during the
"cooperative phase" is deterred by the threat to start the punishment phase all
3over again. Abreu and Rubinstein provide a nice interpretation of this initial
phase of punishment as a "show of strength": each machine will "test" at the
beginning of the play the ability of the other machine to punish an eventual
defection. Machines that are unable to "punish" are exploited by unending
defection.
Piccione and Rubinstein [11] prove that this argument fails for sequential
games like the Trust Game. To see this, consider that in the TG the "punish-
ment phase" would be a ￿nite number of rounds in which the Sender plays NT
and the Receiver plays NR. The problem is that Receiver￿ s behavior cannot be
observed when the Sender plays NT. It follows that the Receiver can eliminate
the states associated with the preliminary phase (in which he plays NR) and
reduce the complexity of his strategy. Without the preliminary "punishment
phase", however, cooperation cannot be in equilibrium.
Piccione and Rubinstein￿ s result is based on the assumption that players are
constrained to choose pure strategies. The exclusion of mixed strategies from
the analysis of repeated games played by ￿nite automata, which goes back to
Abreu and Rubinstein [1], stemmed "in part from a feeling of unease about the
interpretation of mixed strategies in a number of standard economic applica-
tions" (p. 1266). A further source of di¢ culty is that there is no obvious way
to model the complexity of a mixed strategy and the associated cost. However,
in the evolutionary environment discussed by B&S and Volij [14] there is a nat-
ural interpretation of mixed strategies as polymorphisms within populations of
agents. A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium can thus be interpreted as a dis-
tribution of the population among several machines. All the machines that are
represented in the population would earn the same payo⁄, which is no smaller
than the payo⁄ that would be obtained by any machine that is not represented.
We shall show that, once the restriction to pure strategies is removed, the
repeated TG admits an equilibrium (in mixed strategies) in which players￿aver-
age payo⁄s approach the payo⁄s of the cooperative outcome of the stage-game
as the cost of complexity approaches zero. Besides this equilibrium, there is also
a compact set of equilibria in which the Sender never trusts the Receiver and
the corresponding payo⁄ is zero for both players.
To assess the stability of each equilibrium we shall use the so called Best
Response Dynamics (see Hofbauer and Kuzmics [8]). Our main result is that
there is a best-response path that leads from the set of non-cooperative equilibria
to the cooperative mixed-strategy NE. At the same time, all paths of the Best
Response Dynamics that originate su¢ ciently close to the cooperative mixed
strategy NE will converge to it. It follows that the cooperative mixed strategy
NE is socially stable in the sense introduced by Matsui [9], while the set of non-
cooperative equilibria is not. This result should be contrasted with Volij [14],
who proves that in the repeated PD with complexity costs only Defect is an
evolutionary stable strategy, and with Piccione and Rubinstein [11], who prove
that in the repeated TG there are only non-cooperative equilibria.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the necessary technical-
ities and de￿nitions. Section 3 contains the proof that a cooperative equilibrium
exists in the repeated TG. Section 4 introduces the Best Response Dynamics
4and proves that the cooperative equilibrium is the only stable equilibrium. Sec-
tion 5 concludes by pointing out some possible lines for further research. Longer
proofs are relegated to the appendixes.
2 The model: De￿nitions
Two players repeatedly play the Trust Game in Figure 1. We shall indicate with
SS = fT;NTg and SR = fR;NRg the pure strategy sets for the Sender and
the Receiver. The set E = fNT;(T;NR);(T;R)g is the set of outcomes of the
game. (Note that since the trust game is an extended form game, E does not
correspond to SS ￿ SR.) hi(e) is the payo⁄ that player i obtains on reaching
the end-node e 2 E (i = Sender;Receiver).
Strategies for the repeated game are represented by means of ￿nite automata.
A ￿nite automaton, or a machine, M is a collection of states of which one is
the initial one. Each state is associated to a strategy, which is the strategy
the automaton plays when in that state. After each round the state of the
automaton changes depending upon its current state and the outcome of the
previous round.2
Formally, a machine for player i is a quadruple < Qi;q0
i ;￿;￿ > with the
following characteristics.
￿ Qi is a set of states
￿ q0
i is the initial state
￿ ￿i : Qi ! Si is the output function
￿ ￿i : Qi ￿ E ! Qi is the transition function.
Let MS and MR be the set of ￿nite automata for player S and R. Two
machines (MS;MR) playing against each other produce a deterministic history
of strategies chosen by the two players (st). E(st) is the set of end nodes reached
as a consequence of the history of play st, and hi(E(st)) is the set of payo⁄s
obtained by player i in this history. The payo⁄ resulting from (MS;MR) for
player i = S;R is thus ￿i(MS;MR) = (1￿￿)
P1
t=1 ￿
t￿1hi(E(st)), where ￿ is the
time discount factor.
Each state after the ￿rst one has a cost c, so that a machine Mi will have
a cost c ￿ jMij, where jMij is the number of states of machine Mi minus one.
The overall payo⁄ a machine Mi obtains in a match (MS;MR) is
￿c




= ￿i(MS;MR) ￿ cjMij
2The transition depends upon the outcome of the game, not the strategy pro￿le. The
reason is that at the end of the game only the outcome can be observed.
5We shall denote with G1 the quadruple < MS;MR;￿c
S;￿c
R >. G1 is
usually referred to as the machine game. The game is assumed to be played
simultaneously. Each player chooses a machine at the beginning of the game,
and then the repeated game is played by the machines themselves. Players￿
payo⁄s are represented by ￿c
S and ￿c
R.
Let ￿ Mi ￿ Mi be a ￿nite set of machines for player i = S;R. We shall
indicate with ￿( ￿ Mi) the set of probability distributions over ￿ Mi. The two
players are assumed to have beliefs about the behavior of the other player. These
beliefs will be represented by two probability distributions p 2 ￿( ￿ MS) and q 2
￿( ￿ MR) for two set of machines ￿ MS and ￿ MR. p(MS) (q(MR)) is the probability
with which player R (S) expects S (R) to use her machine MS 2 ￿ MS (MR 2
￿ MR). Notice that mixed strategies are interpreted as subjective uncertainty
and not as conscious randomization. This is the natural interpretation in view
of the evolutionary model discussed in the next section.











Note that payo⁄s are only de￿ned for pure strategies. Since players are only
assumed to play pure strategies, we do not need, and do not provide, a de￿nition
for the payo⁄ of a mixed strategy.
The best response correspondence for player S is de￿ned as
BRS(q) = fMS 2 MS : ￿c
S(MS;q) ￿ ￿c
S(M0
S;q) for all M0
S 2 MSg
The corresponding concepts for player R have similar de￿nitions.
What follows is the de￿nition of equilibrium that we shall use in proving our
main result.
De￿nition 1 We say that a pair of beliefs (p;q) forms a Nash equilibrium
for the machine game G1 if (a) p(MS) > 0 implies that MS 2 BRS(q) and
(b) q(MR) > 0 implies that MR 2 BRR(p).
In equilibrium, player i expects player j to use his pure strategy Mj with
positive probability only if Mj is a best response to player j￿ s beliefs.
Our second de￿nition extends the notion of a Closed Under Rational Behav-
ior (CURB) set proposed in Weibull and Basu [3] to the game G1. The need
for this de￿nition will become apparent in the proof of Proposition 2.
De￿nition 2 Let ( ￿ MS; ￿ MR) be two ￿nite sets of automata. We say that
( ￿ MS; ￿ MR) is a CURB set for the game G1 if (a) for all q 2 ￿( ￿ MR), MS 2
BRS(q) implies that MS 2 ￿ MS and (b) for all p 2 ￿( ￿ MS), MR 2 BRR(p)
implies that MR 2 ￿ MR. A set is a minimal CURB set if it contains no proper
subsets that are CURB sets.
6Figure 2: The unique minimum CURB set of the machine game.
Intuitively, a set of machines ( ￿ MS; ￿ MR) is a CURB set if, when player i
expects player j to choose with positive probability only strategies in ￿ Mj he
will only choose a strategy within ￿ Mi. As for the notion of Nash equilibrium,
the notion of CURB set does not require a de￿nition of the complexity of a
mixed strategy, because mixed strategies only appear as player￿ s beliefs.
3 Results
This section introduces the ￿rst result of the paper: that is, the existence of a
cooperative mixed strategy NE for the repeated TG. We shall prove this result
as a corollary of a somewhat stronger proposition. We shall in fact prove ￿rst
that any machine game G1 has a small minimal CURB set, and that there is
one cooperative equilibrium within that set.
Figure 2 contains all the automata that form the unique minimal CURB set
of game G1. These are: all the one-state machines for both players (M0
S; M1
S
for the Sender and M0
R, M1
R for the Receiver) plus a two-states machine for the
sender M
g










S vS(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ c;VR(1 ￿ ￿) 1 ￿ c;1
Table 2: A simpli￿ed version of the machine game
the ￿rst round and keeps playing T as long as the other player has played R.3 It
reverts to a constant play of NT after the ￿rst round in which the other player
has played NR.
These strategies yield very simple patterns when matched against each other.
M0






R) produce an uninterrupted stream of
(T;R). (M1
S;M0










R g and S = fSR;SSg. We shall in-
dicate with GS the game in which player￿ s choices are restricted to the set S.
Table 2 represents GS.
All proofs are based on the following assumption:
Assumption 1 i) ￿ ￿ ￿crit := VR￿1
VR
ii) c ￿ ccrit := ￿ ￿ vS
(1￿vS)
￿crit is the threshold value of ￿ such that when ￿ ￿ ￿crit (M
g
S;M1
R) is a Nash
equilibrium in the machine game without complexity costs (c = 0). This is the
familiar condition that players must be su¢ ciently patient for cooperation to
be a Nash equilibrium in a repeated game The second condition imposes that
complexity costs are su¢ ciently small with respect to ￿ and vS.
Proposition 1 Let Assumption 1 hold. Then the set S is the unique minimal
CURB set for G1.
The proof is in the Appendix; here I shall only present a sketch of the proof
that S is in fact a minimal CURB set. First note that against M0
S all Receiver￿ s
machines obtain the same payo⁄ (zero). Hence, it su¢ ces to consider what any
alternative machine can obtain against M1
S and M
g
S. The key of the proof is
that against M1




with the minimum number of states. Against M
g
S no machine that always plays
R can do better than M1
R.
On the other hand, if a machine ￿ MR that plays NR for the ￿rst time in
round n > 1 obtains a larger payo⁄ than M1
R against the mixed strategy chosen
by the Sender, then M0
R (which plays NR at the ￿rst round) will obtain an even
3For the sake of a simple notation, we use the same letters for strategies and outcomes,
when this does not create confusion. So in Figure 2 a letter R stands for the outcome (T;R),
and NR stands for (T;NR) and so on.
8larger payo⁄, because it would obtain a larger payo⁄ with a smaller number of
states.
Similarly, any machine ￿ MS with jMSj > 0 that never plays Trust is strictly
dominated by M0
S, because it contains a larger number of states and obtains
the same repeated game payo⁄ (zero). Now consider a machine ￿ MS that plays
T for the ￿rst time in round n. The proof consists in showing that any such
machine cannot obtain in the course of the repeated game a payo⁄ which is




The following is a simple corollary of Proposition 1, which is worth stating
as a separate result.
Corollary 1 All the NE for GS are NE also for G1.
The following proposition characterizes the NE for GS, and, because of the
previous corollary, of G1.
Proposition 2 The game GS has a connected component of NE in which the
Sender chooses M0
S with probability one and the Receiver chooses M0
R with a
probability q0 ￿ min( 1
1￿vS; 1￿c
1￿vS(1￿￿)) := ~ q0. We shall refer to this set of NE
as N. If Assumption 1 is met, this game has also a mixed strategy NE (p￿;q￿)
where p￿ = (0;
VR(￿ ￿1)
￿ VR ; VR￿1
￿ VR ) and q￿ = (￿ c
vS ￿; vS ￿+c
vS ￿ ).The payo⁄s that the
two players receive in the equilibrium (p￿;q￿) converge to (1;1) as c ! 0.
Proof. When the Sender￿ s conjecture is (q0;1￿q0) (where q0 is the probability
with which he expects M0
R to be played) the payo⁄ in playing M1
S is vSq0 +
(1 ￿ q0), while the payo⁄ in playing M
g
S is (vS(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ c)q0 + (1 ￿ c)(1 ￿ q0).
M0
S is thus a best reply provided that both these magnitudes are non positive,
which requires q0 ￿ 1
1￿vS and q0 ￿ 1￿c
1￿vS(1￿￿). If ￿ < ￿crit, M0
R is a weakly
dominant strategy for the Receiver, and therefore there are no other NE in the
game. If ￿ ￿ ￿crit, if the Receiver￿ s conjecture is p￿, he is indi⁄erent between
M0
R and M1
R. If the Sender￿ s conjecture is q￿, she is indi⁄erent between M0
S and
M1
S. The Sender￿ s payo⁄ in playing these two strategies is equal to c￿c vS+￿ vS
￿ vS .
This magnitude must be non negative, because otherwise M0
S would be a best
response. This requires that c ￿ ccrit = ￿ ￿ vS
(1￿vS). Finally, the Receiver￿ s payo⁄
in equilibrium is constant and equal to one. As c ! 0, q￿ ! (0;1). Since the




1 ! 1 this payo⁄ converges to 1 as
well.
There is a clear intuition behind both (sets of) NE in Proposition 2. First,
there is a set of NE in which the Sender chooses the non-trusting machine M0
S
because she expects, with a su¢ ciently high probability, the Receiver to choose
the non rewarding machine M0
R. These are not strict NE, though, because when
the Sender chooses M0
S the Receiver is in fact indi⁄erent between M0
R and M1
R.
The second NE is slightly more complex. The Sender expects the Receiver to
always play Reward (M1
R) or always play Not Reward (M0
R) and the probability
he puts on these two strategies are such that he gets the same payo⁄by choosing
the unconditionally trustful machine M1










quits trusting after the ￿rst time that the Receiver has played NR. So, while
M1
S yields higher payo⁄s when the Receiver plays M1
R with su¢ ciently high
probability, M
g
S becomes the best reply when the non rewarding machine M1
R is
expected with a larger probability. The trick of the proof is that when the cost
of an extra state is su¢ ciently low (i.e. when c < ccrit) it pays to have an extra
state to discriminate between M0
R and M1
R rather that reverting to the simpler
(but not discriminating) machine that never trusts M0
S.
4 Learning
The previous section has shown that, contrary to the result obtained by Piccione
and Rubinstein [11], the repeated TG admits a cooperative equilibrium (in
mixed strategy). However, there is also a set N of equilibria in which there
is no cooperation. In this section we shall investigate the dynamic stability of
these two equilibria.
Consider the following extremely simpli￿ed model of learning.4 There are
two large (in￿nite) populations of agents which, with an abuse of notation, we
shall denote as S (Sender) and R (Receiver). The game G1 is played by pairs
of individuals drawn at random from S and R. Each agent in each population
adopts a ￿nite machine. The state of the two populations is represented by a
pair (p(t);q(t)), where p(t) and q(t) are the distributions among the machines
within the S and R population respectively. Let pMS(t) and qMR(t) be the
fraction of the population S and R that use machines MS and MR respectively
at time t. As above, let BRS(q(t)) and BRR(p(t)) be the set of best replies for
the Sender and the Receiver respectively when the state of the two populations
is (p(t);q(t)).
Agents in each population revise their strategies at a ￿xed rate. When revis-
ing her strategy, an agent will switch to one of the best replies. These hypotheses
ensure that the states of the two populations evolve according to the di⁄erential
inclusions
_ p(t) = bS(t) ￿ p(t) (1)
_ q(t) = bR(t) ￿ q(t)
where bS(t) 2 BRS(q(t)) and bR(t) 2 BRR(q(t)) for all t.5 This is the well
known Best Response Dynamics (BRD).





S respectively and q0 and q1 be the fractions of R that play M0
R and M1
R.
With an abuse of notation we shall indicate with ￿(S) the set of population
states in which only machines in S are represented.
4This is the continuous and deterministic counterpart of the stochastic learning model
proposed by Volij [14].
5Note that these are not di⁄erential equations, because best replies might not be unique,
so that more than one orbit can originate from the same initial condition.
10Proposition 3 The set ￿(S) is invariant under the BRD. That is, for any
initial condition (p(0);q(0)) 2 ￿(S), for any t > 0 (p(t);q(t)) 2 ￿(S).
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the de￿nition of the BRD and
CURB set.
This proposition allows us to study the stability properties of the equilibria
in the only minimal curb set of the game as if that were an independent game.
In fact, if the system starts at any point of ￿(S), the dynamics will not take it
out of ￿(S).
The stability concept we shall use was introduced by Matsui [9]. Intuitively,
a set of states X is stable if there is no best response path that leads from
any element of X to a state which is not in X. To make this precise, we
need some further piece of terminology. A strategy distribution (p;q) 2 ￿(S)
is directly accessible from (p0;q0) if there exists a best reply path such that
(p(0);q(0)) = (p;q) and (p(T);q(T)) = (p0;q0) for some T ￿ 0. Also (p0;q0) is
accessible from (p;q) if one of the following holds true: (i) (p0;q0) is directly
accessible from (p;q); (ii) there exists a sequence (pn;qn) converging at (p0;q0)
such that (pn;qn) is directly accessible from (p;q) for any n; (iii) if (p0;q0) is
accessible from another (p00;q00) which is accessible from (p;q).
We need one ￿nal de￿nition: a set of states F ￿ ￿(S) is a cyclically stable
set (CSS) if (i) any (p0;q0) = 2 F (p;q) is not accessible from any (p;q) 2 F, and
(ii) any (p;q) 2 F is accessible from any (p0;q0) 2 F. The idea of a CSS is that
a set of states F is stable if the best response dynamics (1) cannot leave F.
We are now ready to formulate our main proposition
Proposition 4 In game G1, the mixed strategy NE (p￿;q￿) is cyclically stable.
The set of NE N is not cyclically stable.
The proof is in the Appendix. Here we shall only provide a graphical il-
lustration. Consider Figure 3. This represents the state space ￿(S), with the
two (sets of) Nash equilibria (p￿;q￿) and N. It also represents two orbits gen-
erated by the BRD. The ￿rst orbit originates from x, which lies on the face
where p0 = 0. and has the familiar appearance of the orbits generated in 2 ￿ 2
games with a single mixed strategy NE (see for example Berger [4]). p0 remains
constantly equal to zero, while the population converges towards (p￿;q￿). The
second orbit starts from y 2 N and converges to (p￿;q￿), just like the ￿rst
one. The logic of the proof is to show that from any point in N there is a
best response path that approaches (p￿;q￿), while there are no best response
paths going from (p￿;q￿) to N. Actually, (p￿;q￿) attracts all best response paths
originating in a su¢ ciently small neighborhood.
5 Conclusions
The results presented here show that the details of the interaction in PD situa-
tions do have a crucial impact on the chances that cooperation has of emerging.
11Figure 3: Orbits generated by the BRD on ￿(S)
Volij [14] and Samuelson and Swinkels [13] prove that cooperation can only
emerge if the time horizon is so long that the limit of the mean criterion can
be employed, and complexity costs are so small that they can be ranked lexi-
cographically after game payo⁄s. We have proven that these conclusions only
hold if the game being repeated is the simultaneous PD. In the repeated TG,
the non cooperative equilibrium is dynamically unstable even when payo⁄s are
evaluated with the discount criterion, and complexity costs directly enter into
a machine￿ s payo⁄ function. There are several ways in which this result could
be extended. For example, dynamics other than the Best Response Dynamics
could be used. Also, it would be interesting to analyze the case in which choices
are noisy, so that players occasionally play Not Reward even when they intend
to play Reward. These and many other extensions are left for future research.
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13A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We shall prove Proposition 1 with the help of three Lemmata.
Lemma 1 The set of strategies S is a minimal CURB set for any Gn.
Proof. We must show that any machine for the Sender and the Receiver Mi = 2 S
(i = S;R) yields, against any element of ￿(S), a payo⁄ which is strictly smaller
than the payo⁄ o⁄ered by at least one element of S. First consider any machine
for the sender ￿ MS = 2 S. ￿ MS has at least two states, because otherwise it would
belong to S. If it never plays T, its payo⁄ is 0￿cj ￿ MSj < 0 (c ￿ 1) and hence it
is strictly dominated by M0
S, whose payo⁄ is zero. Suppose thus that ￿ MS plays
T at the beginning of the game (there is no loss of generality in this assumption,
because none of the machines in SR behave di⁄erently depending on the round
in which the ￿rst T takes place). Its payo⁄ against M0
R is thus bounded above
by vS(1￿￿)￿cj ￿ MSj. Its payo⁄against M1
R is bounded above by 1￿cj ￿ MSj. As a
consequence, ￿ MS is strictly dominated by M
g
S whenever j ￿ MSj > 1. If j ￿ MSj = 1,
￿ MS is a two-states machine whose initial state is T and the other is NT. (If
both states were T, ￿ MS would be dominated by M1
S, because it would always
play T but it would have two states rather than one). It is a tedious exercise
to show that all two states machines in which the ￿st state is T are strictly
dominated by M
g




Now consider an alternative machine for the Receiver ￿ MR = 2 SR. The analy-
sis is simpli￿ed by the fact that all Receiver￿ s machines obtain the same payo⁄
(zero) against M0




S. ￿ MR has at least two states. If the initial state is NR, it is dom-
inated by M0
R. To see this, consider that against M1
S any machine obtains at
most VR ￿cj ￿ MRj < VR, while against M
g
S a machine that plays NR in the ￿rst




S play NT, unless the Receiver has played NR once. If ￿ MR
always plays R after any T, ￿ MR is strictly dominated by M1
R. The reason is




has at least two states. So ￿ MR must have at least one state in which it plays
NR, which is reached after a sequence of Ts. After it has played NR the ￿rst
time, the best that MR can do is keep playing NR, for M
g
S will not play Trust
any longer, while M1
S will continue to play T. As a consequence, MR obtains
the same payo⁄ as M0
R, beginning at round n. Before that, it obtains a stream
of 1. Let ￿0(p) and ￿1(p) = 1 be the payo⁄ obtained by M0
R and M1
R resp.
when the Sender plays the mixed strategy p. If the Receiver uses ￿ MR he ob-
tains: ￿ ￿(p) = 1 ￿ ￿
n + ￿
n￿0(p) ￿ cj ￿ MRj. Clearly, if ￿0(p) ￿ ￿1(p) = 1, then
￿0(p) > ￿ ￿(p), so that ￿ MR cannot be a best response. If ￿0(p) ￿ ￿1(p) = 1, then
￿1(p) = 1 > ￿ ￿(p), and again ￿ MR cannot be a best response.
14Lemma 2 Let MS and MR be two machines for the Sender and the Receiver
resp. such that jMij ￿ 2. If MR 2 BRR(MS), then jMRj < jMSj, while if
MS 2 BRS(MR), then jMRj ￿ jMSj
Proof. The second part of the lemma is just a consequence of Piccione and
Rubinstein [11] Lemma 1. To prove the ￿rst part we have to show that the
best reply for the Receiver to any machine MS of the Sender contains a strictly
smaller number of states. Consider any machine MS =< QS;q1
S;￿S;￿S > which
has at least two states. Let bR : QS ! SR be the policy function that maximizes
the Receiver￿ s payo⁄ stream against MS. Now consider a machine for the re-
ceiver ￿ MR de￿ned as follows ￿ MR =< QS;q1
S;￿R;￿R >, where ￿R(qS) = bR(qS)
and ￿R(qS;:) = ￿S(qS;E(￿S(qS);￿R(qS)). This machine has the same set of
states of MS and implements the optimal policy, so that it maximizes the Re-
ceiver￿ s repeated game payo⁄s. We now show that it is possible to construct
an alternative machine for the Receiver ^ MR that behaves like ￿ MR against MS
(and hence obtains the same payo⁄), but has a smaller number of states. Con-
sider ￿rst a match (MS; ￿ MR). If one state ^ qS 2 QS is not reached in a match
(MS; ￿ MR), one can obtain ^ MR by replacing QS with QS ￿ ^ qS. ^ MR obtains the
same payo⁄ as ￿ MR and contains a smaller number of states. Suppose then that
all states in QS are reached. There must be at least one succession of states
^ QS = f^ q1
S;::; ^ qk
Sg (with k ￿ 1), such that ￿S(^ qt
S;NT) = ^ q
t+1
S , and ￿S(^ qt) = NT.
In other words, there must be a succession of (at least one) states in which the
Sender plays NT. (If all states were T, the Receiver￿ s best reply would be M0
R).
There are two possibilities. First, ^ q1
S = q1
S (the succession of NT starts at the
beginning of the game) and ￿S(^ qk




S ) = T (after k
rounds MS enters a state in which plays T). Consider the following machine
^ MR =< ^ QR;q1
R;￿R;￿R >, where ^ QR = QS ￿ ^ QS and q1
R = ^ q
k+1
S . This ma-
chine is obtained by ￿ MR by selecting q
k+1
S ad the initial state and removing the
￿rst k states. It behaves exactly as ￿ MR against MS and therefore obtains the
same payo⁄, with less states. A second possibility is that ^ q1
S 6= q1
S, that is, the
succession of NT does not start at the beginning of the game. Let ￿ qS 2 QS
be the state such that ￿S(￿ qS;E(￿S(￿ qS);￿R(￿ qS))) = ^ q1
S and ￿S(￿ qS) = T. ￿ qS is
thus the last state in which MS plays T against ￿ MR before entering the succes-
sion ^ QS of states in which it plays NT. Let q
ﬂ








S is the state MS enters at the end of the
succession ^ QS. If q
ﬂ
S 2 ^ QS, MS never leaves ^ QS. In this case ￿ MS must be modi-
￿ed as follows: QR = QS ￿ ^ QS and ￿R(￿ qR;E(￿S(￿ qS);￿R(￿ qS))) = ￿ qR. Finally, if
q
ﬂ
S = 2 ^ QS, then ￿S(￿ qS) = T, so after playing NT for k rounds, MS plays T again.
In this case ￿ MR must be modi￿ed as follows: ￿R(￿ qS;E(￿S(￿ qS);￿R(￿ qS))) =q
ﬂ
S.
In all the cases we obtain a machine that obtains the maximum payo⁄s against
MS with a strictly smaller number of states.
The second part of this lemma is a well known result in this kind of literature:
the best reply to a machine never contains more states that the machine itself.
The ￿rst part of the Lemma depends upon the sequential structure of the Trust
Game. This result follows the same argument presented in the Introduction to
15show that the "show of strength" argument do not work for sequential games.
Lemma 3 There are no minimal CURB sets other than S in G1.
Proof. By way of contradiction, assume that S0=fS0
R;S0
Sg is a set of machines
for the Sender and the Receiver, such that S0 is a minimal CURB set. Of course,
S0 \ S = ?. (If any of the machines in S were also in S0, S0 would not be a
minimal CURB set.) Let MS 2 MS, such that jMSj ￿ jM0
Sj for each M0
S 2 S0
S.
Thus MS is one of the machines that have the minimal number of states in S0
S.
Since S is a CURB set, it must be that if MR 2 BRR(MS), then MR 2 S0
R.
Because of Lemma 2, jMRj < jMSj. Since S0 is a CURB set, it must also be that
all best replies to MR are in MS. This implies that there exists a strategy ￿ MS
such that ￿ MS 2 BRS(MR) and ￿ MS 2 MS. Because of Lemma 2, this implies
that j ￿ MSj ￿ jMRj. We thus have that j ￿ MSj ￿ jMRj < jMSj, which contradicts
that jMSj ￿ jM0
Sj for each M0
S 2 MS.
Clearly, Lemma 2 and Lemma 2 imply Proposition 1.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The only two candidates for a CSS are the NE (p￿;q￿) and the set
of NE N. We prove the proposition by showing that (p￿;q￿) is a CSS and
that (p￿;q￿) is accessible from any (p;q) 2 N, which of course implies that N
cannot be a CSS. The orbits on the face spanned by p1 and q0 can be easily
computed, provided that they do not cross the threshold ~ q0. In fact, as long
as q0(t) < ~ q0, M0
S is not a best reply, which guarantees that p0 remains zero.
The logic of the proof is to calculate the Poincare section of the two orbits,
using the plan fx;y;y0;(p￿;q￿)g, which we shall denote as H. Let (qn
0(x)) and
(qn
0(y)) be the values taken by q0(t) when crossing the plane H starting from
x and y respectively where n = 0;1;2::: denotes the successive crossings. We
shall show that for any n, (qn
0(y)) = (qn
0(x)). This means that the fraction of
M0
R players when orbits cross the plane H does not depend upon the initial
fraction of M0
S players within the S population. Since we know that (qn
0(x))
approaches q￿
0 monotonically, this implies that the same will happen for (qn
0(y)).
Furthermore, q0(t) remains below ~ q0 for any t > 0, and hence along the best
response path originating from y, p0(t) goes monotonically to zero and p1(t)
and pg(t) approach p￿
1 and p￿
g.
Consider any point on H. At any such point p1 = p￿
1(1 ￿ p00), with p00 2
[0;1], and q0 2 [q￿
0; ~ q0] One of the best replies for the sender is clearly M
g
S, so that
one has that when p1(0) = p￿(1￿p00), a best reply path is p1(t) = p￿(1￿p00)e￿t,
with t 2 [0;t1). t1 = log(
q0
q￿
0 ) is the time it takes for population R to move from
q0 to q￿
0.Let p11 be p1(t1). When q0(t) = q￿
0, M1
S becomes the best reply, so





1. This requires that
1 ￿ (1 ￿ p11)e￿(t￿t1)
1 ￿ p00e￿t = p￿
1
1 ￿ (1 ￿ (p￿(1 ￿ p00)e￿t1))e￿(t￿t1)
1 ￿ p00e￿t = p￿
1






1 ), which does not
depend on p00. This means that starting from y, p1 will take the same time
t2 to come back to p￿
1, as when starting from x. At that time, one would have
that q0(t2) = ~ q0e￿t2. With an analogous reasoning one can show that it takes
the same time t3 for the system to go back to the plane H, independently of
the point (x or y) from which the orbit started. One can iterate this reasoning
to show that in fact (qi
0(y)) = (qi
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￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿. ￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ /￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ #￿ ￿￿￿ 0￿￿￿￿￿￿ 0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿&￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ! ￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿’￿￿￿2￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ (￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ 0￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ 4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿ 5￿￿￿ 0￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ /￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ "￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ )￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿+ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿%￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿. ￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿(￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿3￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿ ￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
-￿￿￿￿￿4￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2￿￿5￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿*￿-￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ * ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿




￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿0(￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
6￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿6 ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&2￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿0￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&2￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿￿
#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿1 1 ￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ /￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ (￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿1 1 ￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿5￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿5￿￿￿￿3￿￿￿ ￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿&2￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿!￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ 7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿ ’￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿% ￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2￿￿5￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿%￿’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿8  0￿6(￿￿￿
9￿: ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ .￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿   ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿,￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ /￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ .￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿1 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ .￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ /￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ .￿!￿4 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿7 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿
-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ .￿%￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ 0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ .￿(￿ ’￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿ -￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ -￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ; ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿7 8 ￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿1 1 ￿￿￿2￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿9￿￿￿:￿ ￿￿2￿￿￿￿3￿￿￿￿;￿￿￿￿￿￿




￿￿ ￿ .￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ (. ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿. ￿
￿￿￿7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿5. ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ .￿.￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ .￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿* ,￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ < ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< . ￿   ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
6￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿&,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿5￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿?￿&2￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿= ￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿!￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿&0￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿%￿ ’￿￿￿ 0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 6￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿   ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2￿￿5￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿(￿’￿￿￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
"￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&2￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿;   ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿=￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
"￿￿￿￿￿1 1 ￿￿
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￿ ￿ ￿
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￿